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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
THE ILLEGITIMATE'S RIGHT TO BENEFITS
ACCRUING UPON THE DEATH OF HIS PARENTS
The constantly increasing rate of illegitimate births has
become a major social problem. Although the number of unmar-
ried females in the United States decreased in the period from
1938 to 1957 there was a noticeable increase in illegitimate
births.' In 1938 there was an estimated 87,900 illegitimate births,
amounting to 3.84 percent of all live births; in 1957 the figure
had risen to 201,700 or 4.74 percent of all live births.2 A more
recent survey indicates that approximately one birth in sixteen
is an illegitimate one.3 The incidence in some large cities nears
40 percent of live births.4 Constituting a significant segment of
our society, the illegitimate has had rights to benefits derived
from his parents closely regulated. It is the purpose of this Com-
ment to examine both Louisiana and federal legislation in this
area.
A. Federal Legislation
Benefits available to children under federal statutes are
usually contingent upon the father's membership in a given class
or the father having otherwise earned the benefit. Whether or
not an illegitimate child falls within the purview of the term
'child' as used in the statute will be determinative of his right
to the benefits afforded by the statute. Some of the statutes have
defined the term "child," while others provide that the courts
must look to the state law in order to ascertain its meaning.
A third group of statutes neither defines the term nor gives any
indication as to its import, thereby placing the burden of defini-
tion upon the federal courts.
The Social Security Act, while originally providing that
state law applicable to the devolution of intestate personal
property would govern the definition of the term "child,"5 was
amended in 1965 to reduce the discrimination against the illegi-
timate child. Now a child is afforded the benefits of the act
1. WEBB, THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGITIMACY 8 (1961).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRAar OF THE UNITED STATES 47,
51 (86th ed. 1965).
4. WEBB, THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGITIMACY 9 (1961).
5. 64 Stat. 511 (1950), as amended, 72 Stat. 1030 (1958), 42 U.S.C. §
416(h) (2) (1958).
6. 64 Stat. 492 (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (1965) provides:
"An applicant will be considered the child of the worker if the worker
(1) has acknowledged in writing that he is the child's father; (2) has been
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if the father has acknowledged the child in writing, has been
judicially decreed to be the father of the child, has been judi-
cally ordered to support the child, or has been shown by other
evidence to be the father of the child and has been living with
or supporting the child.1 An illegitimate child seeking benefits
under the Veteran's Administration Act must meet the same
tests as those provided in the Social Security Act." The Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 9 definition
of "child" includes an "acknowledged illegitimate child depen-
dent upon the deceased."' o Under the last act it has been decided
that the term "illegitimate" is to be interpreted according to
state law" while the term "acknowledged" has been inter-
preted according to the purpose of the statute and contrary to
state law when necessary.12
The Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act's pro-
vides that benefits from the insurance be distributed, in order
of precedence to the beneficiary, the deceased's widow, his
children and their descendants by representation, his parents,
his executor or administrator, or his next of kin.' 4 The provi-
sions of the Copyright Act 5 which give the "widow, widower
or children of the author, if the author be not living, . . . then
the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next
of kin," the right of renewal, are very similar to those of the
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act.'6 In both acts
dependency and loss are not determinative of eligibility. Bene-
fits are awarded simply because the recipient has been designated
by the deceased or he is within the required degree of rela-
decreed by a court to be the child's father; (3) has been ordered by the
court to contribute to the support of the child because he is the child's
father; or (4) Is shown by other evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to
be the child's father and has been living with or contributing to the support
of the child."
7. 64 Stat. 492 (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (1965).
8. 38 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
9. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958).
10. 44 Stat. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(14) (1958).
11. Ellis v. Henderson, 204 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873
(1953). There the wife of the deceased lived openly with another man who
was apparently the father of her children. The court allowed recovery
under the Longshoremen's Act, since all nine children were "conclusively
presumed" to be the children of the husband under Louisiana law.
12. Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Marshall, 102 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1939).
There the state law required a written acknowledgment but the court
decided that an oral acknowledgment would be sufficient to entitle the
Illegitimate children to the benefits of the Act.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1966).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 8705 (1966).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
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tionship. Neither statute defines the term "child" with reference
to illegitimates and the courts have consistently looked to state
law governing the descent of property to ascertain who will be a
recipient of the benefits. 17
The third group of statutes is composed of the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act,'8 the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,19 and the Jones Act.20 Here the decisions of the federal
courts have evolved a definition of the term "child" which in-
cludes the illegitimate. This was first decided in the leading
case of Middleton v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 21 involving the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act. The court reasoned that the law
of the place of injury should control in order to insure uni-
formity in recovery, but since the controlling law was the law
of the high seas, federal law had to be applied. While the
reasoning of the court seems questionable, it has produced the
desired uniformity and has been consistently followed.22 Since
most accidents involving the Jones Act also occur on the high
seas, the courts have followed the results reached in Middleton
and apply federal law to the term "children. '28 It has not,
however, been determined if a federal definition of the term
"children" will be applied where the accident occurred within
the jurisdiction of the state and recovery is sought under the
Jones Act.24 Although some early decisions interpreted the
Federal Employers' Liability Act by reference to state laws of
inheritance it now seems to be well established that a federal
17. In Grave v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Va. 1959),
the court said that "the state law must control the familial relation-
ship." The same sentiments were expressed in interpreting the Copy-
right Act by the court in De Sylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956):
"The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does
not mean that its contents is not to be determined by state, rather than fed-
eral law .. "
18. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. H§ 761-67 (1964).
19. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
20. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
21. 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1934).
22. It is submitted that the court could have avoided the roundabout
reasoning and have reached the same result by interpreting the term "chil-
dren" in reference to the end the statute is trying to accomplish. If
the end of the statute is more important on a given issue than the policies
of the states, then local law should not be looked to on that issue.
23. Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954). Since this
accident occurred on the high seas, the court merely adopted the definition
of the term "child" which was used in the Luckenbach case.
24. In Huber v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 241 F. Supp. 646 (D. Md. 1965), the
court interpreted the term "children" as used in FELA as including illegiti-
mates, although contrary to state law. Since the Jones Act incorporated in
toto the beneficiary provisions of the FELA, it is highly probable that a
federal definition of the term "children" will likewise be applied to the Jones
Act when the accident occurs within the jurisdiction of the state.
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definition of "children" will be applied unless it is in conflict
with clear state policy.25 Thus under these three acts the illegi-
timate child is entitled to recovery, but unlike the Copyright
and Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act he must show
pecuniary loss. The purpose of these acts is to compensate for
loss suffered by the recipients rather than to control the distri-
bution of property.
As a whole, federal legislation does not severely discrimi-
nate against the illegitimate. This seems justifiable in view of
the fact that the traditional reasons for denying property rights
to illegitimate children have no place in the sphere of federal
legislation designed to provide benefits to the family of the
deceased contributor to a specific fund. To deny the illegitimate
child the right to recover from a source to which his parents
contributed serves only to increase the burden of the state in
providing the child with support. The needs of the illegitimate
child being as great if not greater than the legitimate child,
it appears that the purpose of this legislation would be better
served if both were afforded the same rights.
B. Louisiana Legislation
1. Workmen's Compensation
The Louisiana Compensation Act defines "child" or "children"
as "only legitimate children, step-children, posthumous children,
adopted children, and illegitimate children acknowledged under
the provisions of Civil Code articles 203, 204, and 205."26 Thus
the acknowledged illegitimate child has the same rights to com-
pensation upon the death of its parent which the legitimate
child has, with one notable exception. An illegitimate can be
acknowledged posthumously, but the act has been interpreted
as not providing coverage for this child. The courts have
repeatedly held that only the modes of acknowledgment pro-
vided for in the Civil Code will entitle the illegitimate child to
recover.27
25. Bowen v. New York Cent. R.R., 179 W. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1959),
referred to state law to define the term "children." However, that case
seems to be overruled by the decision in Huber v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 241
F. Supp. 646 (D. Md. 1965), which held that a federal definition should be
used unless it conflicted with clear state policy.
26. LA. R.S. 23:1021(3) (19501.
27. In Barranco v. Davis, 175 La. 35, 142 So. 844 (1932), the court found
an acknowledgment by the mother; but since that acknowledgment did not
bind the father, the court denied compensation.
In the following cases the court found that the acknowledgment did not
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The Act, however, also provides that "other dependent mem-
bers than those enumerated" are entitled to compensation. 28
Thus, in the early case of Gullung v. Dalgarn Constr. Co. 29 the
argument was made that an unacknowledged illegitimate child
was an "other dependent member of the family." Reviewing
the then existing body of jurisprudence, the court rejected the
child's claim. This reasoning was again proposed in Beard v.
Rickert Rice Mills8 and was decided in favor of the unacknowl-
edged illegitimate daughter of the deceased employee in the
court of appeal. However, in the Supreme Court the judgment
was reversed on the ground that the term "legal dependents"
included only legitimate dependents.5s The court concluded that
an unacknowledged illegitimate child, because of its illegitimacy,
is denied the protections of the act even in cases where they
have proved their dependency upon the deceased. But the Beard
case, insofar as it tended to exclude dependent members of the
family of a deceased employee from the protection of the act,
was overruled by Archibald v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,a2
which held that the act must be liberally construed in order to
carry out its purpose and that all that is required "is a family
or household and the existence of the dependency of a member
thereof.' a
Relying upon the reasoning of the Archibald decision the
Supreme Court finally accepted the argument that an illegitimate
child, who could not recover as a "child," could recover as a
dependent member of the family in Thompson v. Vestal Lumber
& Mfg. Co.84 The court reasoned that if the legislature had con-
sidered it against public order or good morals to allow an
unacknowledged illegitimate child compensation for the acci-
dental death of his father, when the child was living with the
meet the requirements of LA. CfvM CODs art. 203 (1870): Stewart v. Parish of
Jefferson ]Davis, 136 So. 659 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931) (certificate of a priest
did not constitute a legal acknowledgment by either of the parents under
art. 203); Wells v. White-Grandin Lumber Co., 129 So.2d 171 (La. 'App. 1st
Cir. 1930) (informal acknowledgment of the paternity of an illegitimate was
not sufficient compliance with art. 203); Gullung v. Dalgarn Constr. Co., 1
La. App. 147 (Orl. Cir. 1924) (an adulterous bastard is unacknowledgeable).
28. LA. R.S. 23:1232(8) (1950).
29. 1 La. App. 147 (Orl. Cir. 1924).
80. 185 La. 55, 168 So. 492 (1936).
31. The court was construing LA. R.S. 23:1231 (1950), which states: "For
injury causing death within one year after the accident there shall be paid
to the legal dependents of the employee, actually and wloily dependent upon
his earnings for support at the time of the accident and death, a weekly
sum as hereinafter provided .... " (Emphasis added.)
32. 202 La. 89, 96, 11 So.2d 492, 494 (1942.
33. Id.
34. 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842 (1945).
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father as a member of his family and was dependent upon his
earnings for support at the time of the accident and death,
it would have expressly excluded such a child from the right
to compensation. In allowing the illegitimate child to recover
the court reasoned that the father had a legal and moral duty
to support his illegitimate child under Civil Code article 240,
and since he was discharging his duty when taken by death,
the child should not now be deprived of that support.3 5
The unacknowledged illegitimate child who establishes his
claim to compensation as a "dependent member of the family"
does not, however, enjoy the same status as the acknowledged
illegitimate child or the legitimate child. A "child" living with
his deceased parent is conclusively presumed to be completely
dependent on the parent and is entitled to maximum compensa-
tion under the act,86 whereas the "dependent member of the
family" may succeed in establishing only partial dependency
and, therefore, be entitled only to partial recovery. 87 The
"dependent member of the family" must be living as a member
of the family unit under the roof of the deceased, 88 whereas the
"child" is entitled to recovery if not living with the deceased,
provided he can prove whole or partial dependency.3 9 Some
decisions of our courts also indicate that a child claiming as a
"dependent member of the family" will not recover if there is
also a dependent wife, "child," or mother or father.40
An illegitimate child born after the death of his father was
held not entitled to benefits under the act as a "dependent
member of the family" in Williams v. American Employers Ins.
Co.41 The court reasoned that the child was not actually depen-
35. LA. CVL CODE art. 240 (1870) declares: "Fathers and mothers owe
alimony to their illegitimate children, when they are in need ...."
36. LA. R.S. 23:1232(1)-(6) (1950) sets out a schedule of benefits for the
"child."
37. To prove dependency the child claiming as a "dependent member of
the family" must show that the deceased made actual contribution to his
support. The dependent is, however, not entitled to compensation to the
extent of the contributions, but only to such compensation to satisfy his
needs.
If such a child proves only partial dependency, i.e., he received only a
portion of his support from the deceased, then the amount of his compen-
sation is determined by LA. R.S. 23:1231 (1950).
38. Archibald v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So.2d 492
(1942).
39. The "child" not living with the deceased could establish his depen-
dency in the same manner as the child claiming as a "dependent member of
the family."
40. Williams v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 38 So.2d 400 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1949); Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, Inc., 24 So.2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
41. 237 La. 101, 110 So.2d 541 (1959).
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dent upon his father at the time of his death. This decision has
been criticized on two grounds. 42 First, it is suggested that the
posthumous child was actually dependent on the father at the
time of his death since the father was providing the mother
with nourishment which ultimately reaches the child through
the body of the mother. Second, the decision is criticized as
being contrary to compensation principles. Since the legislature
expressly provided for compensation to the posthumous legit-
imate child, thereby recognizing the social need for compensa-
tion after the father's death, this reasoning should likewise be
extended to the illegitimate child where the need for com-
pensation is at least equally great.
Thus, while the acknowledged illegitimate child has the
same rights under the act as the legitimate child, the same status
is not given to those illegitimate children who are not acknowl-
edged or who are born after the death of the father.43 For the
reasons previously mentioned it appears that the distinction
between a posthumous illegitimate and a posthumous legitimate
child is highly questionable in view of sound compensation
policy. The distinction between an acknowledged illegitimate
child and an unacknowledged illegitimate child seems likewise
to be contrary to the construction of the act, which has been
repeatedly construed in favor of the employee and his depen-
dents. It is submitted that acknowledgment should not be a
criterion in awarding compensation to an illegitimate child.
If the child can prove his paternity or maternity he should
be entitled to the same benefits as a "child." The traditional
reasons for denying the illegitimate child property rights are
as inapplicable under the Workmen's Compensation Act as in
the sphere of federal welfare legislation. Since the employer
of the parent has contributed to a fund for the benefit of the
employee's dependents, the illegitimate child should not be
denied recovery merely because his parents have not chosen or
have neglected to acknowledge him.
2. Wrongful Death Action-Article 2315
The Louisiana jurisprudence clearly indicates that we will
not allow an illegitimate child to bring an action for the wrong-
42. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 172 (Supp. 1964, at 172-
73).
43. It should be noted that putative children are entitled to recovery
under the Act, since their claims have been analogized to the claim of a
putative wife who is entitled to compensation. Eason v. Alexander Ship-
yards, 47 So.2d 114 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950); Rollins v. Foundation Co., 154
So. 674 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
[Vol. XXVIII
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ful death of its parents under Civil Code article 2315.4 4 Unlike
the Workmen's Compensation Act, the words "child" and "chil-
dren" as used in article 2315 have been interpreted as applying
exclusively to children born of the marriage or to children
who have been duly legitimated by their parents.45 Acknowl-
edged illegitimate children, therefore, have been denied the right
afforded to legitimate children under article 2315.46
The argument that an illegitimate child should be allowed
an action for the wrongful death of its parents was first pressed
upon the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Sesostris
Youchican v. Texas & Pacific Ry.47 In that case an Indian brought
suit for damages for the wrongful death of his mother who
had been married according to the customs of the Tunica Indian
tribe, but the marriage was not legalized in the manner pro-
vided by the Civil Code. The court held that this was not a
valid marriage and its illegitimate offspring could not bring
an action under article 2315 since that article applies exclusively
to legitimate children.
The question of a putative marriage was not raised in the
Youchican case probably because it previously had been held in
Vaughan v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co. 48 that the civil effects of a
putative marriage did not encompass a suit for wrongful death
44. LA. CiiL CODR art. 2315 (1870) as amended, provides: "Every act what-
ever of man, that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property ... is a property right which
on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregularheirs ...
"The right to recover all other damages .... if the injured person dies,
shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in
favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or
either such spouse or such children .... The survivors in whose favor
this right of action survive, may also recover the damages which they sus-
tained through the wrongful death of the deceased."
Cases interpreting art. 2315 as denying recovery to illegitimate children
are: Levy v. State, 192 So.2d 193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Sesostris Youchican
v. Texas & P. Ry., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920); Jackson v. Lindlom, 84
So.2d 101 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
45. Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842
(1945); Sesostris Youchican v. Texas & P. Ry., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920);
Green v. New Orleans S. & G.I. R.S., 141 La. 120, 74 So. 717 (1917); Landry
v. American Creosote Works, 119 La. 231, 43 So. 1016 (1907); Vaughan v.
Dalton-Lard Lumber Co., 119 La. 61, 43 So. 926 (1907); Lynch v. Knoop, 118
La. 611, 43 So. 252 (1907); Buie v. Hester, 147 So.2d 733 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962); Finn v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 141 So.2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962).
46. Benjamin v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 244 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. La.
1965).
47. 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920).
48. 119 La. 61, 43 So. 926 (1907). There the putative wife of the deceased
brought an action as the surviving spouse, but was denied recovery.
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under article 2315. The rationale of the Vaughan decision was
that article 2315 is sui generis and is neither a law of inheritance
nor a law of marriage. It provides for the survival of a right of
action, and a distinct right of action, in favor of certain classes
of persons. Those not included within the express provisions of
the article are excluded and the court refused to extend its
coverage to persons not expressly mentioned. Thus, while an
acknowledged child may be capable of inheriting from its parents,
he is not a "child" within the contemplation of article 2315.
Although the right of a putative child to recover under
article 2315 has never been litigated, the Vaughan case and
several subsequent cases denying recovery to the putative spouse
indicate that by analogy recovery would be denied to the putative
child.49 In view of articles 11760 and 11811 of the Civil Code which
provide that a putative marriage shall produce civil effects in
favor of the children born of the union, these decisions seem
to be questionable. However, the courts' repeated refusal to
allow recovery has been based on the ground that the action
given by article 2315 was purely statutory and not one of the
civil effects of marriage. 52
A recent argument in favor of the illegitimate's right to
recover under article 2315 was advanced in Levy v. State.5 There
it was argued that it was a denial of due process and equal
protection under both the Louisiana and United States Con-
stitutions to deprive illegitimate children of this right simply
because of their status. The court of appeal rejected the conten-
tion and ruled that the denial of the right has substantial relation
to general health, morals, and the welfare of the people because
it discourages promiscuity and the births of illegitimate chil-
dren.54
The jurisprudence is clear that neither an illegitimate child
49. Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So.2d 544 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964); Scott v. LaFontaine, 148 So.2d 780 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Buie v.
Hester, 147 So.2d 733 (La App. 2d Cir. 1962).
50. LA. CIViM CODB art. 117 (1870) provides: "The marriage, which has
been declared null, produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the
parties and their children, if it has been contracted in good faith."
51. "If only one of the parties acted in good faith the marriage pro-
duces its civil effects only in his or her favor, and in favor of the children
born of the marriage."
52. Vaughan v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co., 119 La. 61, 64, 43 So. 926, 927
(1907).
53. 192 So.2d 193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
54. Id. at 195: "Denying illegitimate children the right to recover in
such a case is actually based on morals and general welfare because it dis-
courages bringing children into the world out of wedlock."
[Vol. XXVI
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nor a putative child can recover under article 2315, and the
fact that the child was dependent upon the deceased parent for
support 5r or that he was duly acknowledged makes no differ-
ence. 56 It is submitted that denying the child of a putative mar-
riage the protection afforded by article 2315 is contrary to the
express intent of articles 117 and 118 of the Civil Code. Those
articles give the child of a putative marriage a legitimate status
and, since a legitimate child can take advantage of article 2315,
it seems illogical to deny the same right of action to the putative
child. However, as in the workmen's compensation claims, it is
here suggested that the courts make no distinction between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate child provided paternity
or maternity is proved. By refusing to recognize a right of
action in the illegitimate child under article 2315, the courts
allow the wrongdoer to escape the consequences of his act, and
instead place the burden on the innocent child.
3. Inheritance and Alimony
The illegitimate child inherits as an irregular heir under
the provisions of the Civil Code." His right to inherit is wholly
dependent upon acknowledgment by the parent from whom he
seeks to inherit.58 If he has not been acknowledged by the
parent from whom he seeks inheritance, or if he is incapable of
being acknowledged by him because he is incestuous or adul-
terous, he has no right to inherit from his parents.59 He is,
however, entitled to alimony, but can claim it only in limited
situations." Neither the parents of an unacknowledged child
nor his brothers or sisters are capable of inheriting from the
illegitimate child.61
55. Board of Commissioners v. City of New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d
813 (1953).
56. Lynch v. Knoop, 118 La. 611, 43 So. 252 (1907); Scott v. La Fontaine,
148 So.2d 780 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
57. LA. CML CODE arts. 917-20 (1870).
58. Id. arts. 918, 919. While Civil Code Article 917 is phrased in terms of
"natural children" it must be noted that in Louisiana only those children
who have been acknowledged are recognized as "natural children." This
differs from the French law under which all children born out of wedlock,
who are capable of acknowledgment, are called natural children at their
birth. Minor v. Young, 149 La. 583, 89 So. 757 (1921).
59. LA. CvM CODE art. 920 (1870).
60. Id. The unacknowledged illegitimate child is entitled to alimony
only if he can show that it is necessary for his support. Id. art. 240; O'Gara
v. Riddell, 19 La. Ann. 504 (1867). As to when the duty to pay alimony ter-
minates, see LA. CvnL CODE art. 243 (1870).
61. LA. CIvWL CODE art. 922 (1870). In Lathan v. Edwards, 121 F.2d 183
(5th Cir. 1941), the sister of an unacknowledged child was seeking to inherit
from him under the provision of art. 923. The court held that article 923
19671
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Since inheritance depends upon acknowledgment, it is not
surprising that the modes of acknowledgment sufficient to enable
the illegitimate child to inherit have been repeatedly litigated.62
The early Louisiana jurisprudence distinguished between the
necessity of formal acknowledgment by the mother and the
necessity of such an acknowledgment by the father. The courts
held that the father could acknowledge only by the methods
provided in Civil Code article 203,63 while the mother could
acknowledge by other methods which could be shown by any
legal evidence.0 4 However, this distinction was later abolished
and it became possible for both father and mother to acknowl-
edge by modes other than those provided for in Civil Code
article 203.65 The case of Minor v. Young'6 cast considerable
doubt on the validity of the previous jurisprudence, but sub-
sequent cases have held that the child who has not been
acknowledged in accordance with article 203 may prove "infor-
mal acknowledgment" through admissions of paternity or
maternity and thereby inherit.67 However, it has also been
established that while an illegitimate child may inherit by
proving informal acknowledgment, the parent can inherit from
the illegitimate child only if the parent can show an acknowl-
edgment strictly in accordance with the modes prescribed by
article 203.P
The illegitimate child acknowledged by the mother will
allowed the brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child to inherit only if
the child had been acknowledged and, hence, the sister could not inherit
directly from her unacknowledged brother. The Lathan case was criticized
in Note, 4 LA. L. Rsv. 147 (1941), where the author suggested that the nearest
blood relative should be entitled to inherit, thereby diminishing the suffer-
ing caused by the social attitude toward illegitimate children.
62. For a discussion dealing with formal and informal acknowledgment
under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 203 (1870), see Comments, 6 LA. L. REv. 268 (1945),
6 TUL. L. RHv. 120 (1931).
63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 922 (1870); Succession of Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099(1881); Dupre v. Caruthers, 6 La. Ann. 156 (1851); Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La.
Ann. 305 (1849).
64. Succession of Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099 (1881); Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La.
Ann. 305 (1849); Austin v. Mattle, 4 Orl. App. 148 (La. App. 1907).
65. Succession of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1930); Bourriaque v.
Charles, 107 La. 217, 31 So. 757 (1902); Hart v. Hoess & Elder, 26 La. Ann.
90 (1874).
66. 148 La. 610, 87 So. 472 (1921).
67. Succession of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1930); Murdock v.
Potter, 155 La. 145, 99 So. 18 (1923); Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635(1922); Ford v. Calhoun, 6 La. App. 850 (2d Cir. 1927); Penn v. Jones, 5
La. App. 371 (1st Cir. 1926).
68. Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894 (1920);
Succession of Lacosst, 142 La. 673, 77 So. 497 (1917); Pigeau v. Duvernay,
4 Mart. (O.S.) 265 (La. 1816); Succession of Falls, 4 La. App. 10 (1st Cir.
1925).
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inherit from her to the exclusion of all relatives other than
lawful descendants.6 9 However, the illegitimate child acknowl-
edged by the father inherits from him only when he leaves no
legitimate ascendants, descendants, collaterals, or surviving wife.
The acknowledged illegitimate child takes the succession of the
father only to the exclusion of the state.70
Acknowledged illegimate children do not inherit from the
legitimate relations of their parents.7 1 Finally, it should be
noted that acknowledged illegitimate children, unlike legitimate
children, are not seized as heirs at the instant the ancestor
dies. They have only a right to be put in possession upon a
proper showing.72
While unacknowledged illegitimate children have no right
to inherit, the Civil Code does give them a right to alimony
from their parents.73 The amount of alimony is determined exclu-
sively by the need of the child and the ability of the parent to
pay at the time alimony is granted. However, the amount may
be adjusted as need and ability to pay change.7 4 The obligation
to provide alimony for the illegitimate child ends whenever
he is capable to support himself or when his father and mother
have educated him so that he can support himself. However,
if the child is physically disabled, the obligation continues.
7 5
In order to enforce judicially the right to alimony an illegit-
imate child must prove either acknowledgment by the parent
from whom he claims, or prove that the party is his mother or
father. In addition to establishing his filiation, the illegitimate
child must show absolute need for support.76 The action for
69. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 918 (1870). If the mother has left lawful descen-
dants then the acknowledged illegitimate children are entitled only to
alimony.
70. Id. art. 919.
71. Id. art. 921; Succession of Fernandez, 163 La. 362, 111 So. 787 (1927);
Succession of Fortier, 51 La. Ann. 1562, 26 So. 554 (1899).
72. LA. CIVIL COD 926 (1870); Succession of Fletcher, 11 La. Ann. 59
(1856).
73. LA. CIVIL CODS art. 240 (1870). Alimony encompasses whatever is
necessary for nourishment, lodging, support, and (for minors) education.
Id. art. 230. It should also be noted that this is a reciprocal obligation and,
therefore, the illegitimate children have a corresponding duty towards
their parents. Id. art. 240.
74. O'Gara v. Riddell, 19 La. Ann. 504 (1867); Cleaveland v. Sprowl, 12
Rob. 172 (La. 1845).
75. LA. CIVa CODS: art. 243 (1870). The obligation to provide alimony
after the death of a parent rests on the heirs; however, it is extinguished
if the parent has provided sufficient maintenance for the child during his
lifetime.
76. Id. art. 242.
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alimony cannot properly be brought against the administrator
of the succession of the parent who was charged with the obliga-
tions to support the illegitimate child, for the obligation is owed
by the heirs and not by the succession.77 However, the heirs owe
alimony to the illegitimate child and the obligation to pay con-
tinues while the need exists and the heirs are able to pay.78
The parents of an acknowledged or unacknowledged illegit-
imate child cannot donate, either mortis causa or inter vivos,
any more than that necessary for the support of the child if
there are descendants.79 However, when the mother leaves no
legitimate descendants, the acknowledged illegitimate children
can take by donation the whole of her succession." If the father
has left no legitimate descendants, then his acknowledged illegit-
imate children can take a portion of the father's property by
donation, the remainder going to his legitimate heirs.81 Un-
acknowledgeable children are only entitled to take by disposition
the amount necessary for their support or enough to secure
them in a profession or occupation.8 2
Speaking about the rationale behind the discrimination
against the illegitimate child in inheritance law, the court in
Minor v. Young"8 said:
"The purpose of such restrictions is not to punish the off-
spring of those contravening these rules of morality, but to
raise a warning barrier before the transgressors, prior to
the act, of the consequences of his conduct."
While this may be a desirable purpose, the legislation certainly
77. 1d. art. 241; Drouet v. Succession of Drouet, 26 La. Ann. 323 (1874).
This conclusion seems reasonable, as the payment of alimony may be
necessarily required for a considerable time, and should be made only by
the parties against whom the law creates a claim.
78. Each heir must pay the alimony according to his virile share.
However, if one heir's ability to pay greatly exceeds that of another,
he will be assessed a greater portion. Drouet v. Succession of Drouet,
26 La. Ann. 323 (1874).
79. LA. CVI CODe art. 1483 (1870).
80. Id. art. 1484.
81. Id. 1486.
82. Id. art. 1488 (1870). This makes it possible for the unacknowledged
illegitimate child to receive more than the acknowledged illegitimate child.
Under article 1486 the acknowledged child is restricted to a certain portion
of the testator's property, whereas under article 1488 the only limitation is
"what is necessary to their sustenance," depending on the factual situation
of each particular case. Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 177 So. 695 (1937);
Succession of Vance, 110 La. 760, 34 So. 767 (1903).
83. 149 La. 683, 589, 89 So. 747, 759 (1921).
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has not had that effect. As early as 1851 the court in Dupre v.
Caruthers8 4 made the following observation:
"It is true that the legislation has ever failed in this object
[to honor matrimony and discourage concubinage]; for
probably no one was ever deterred from concubinage by
the consideration that his innocent offspring would be the
victim of his guilt. And the only effect has been, that the
guilty parents have eaten the grapes while the child's teeth,
with tears in his eyes, have been set on edge. But still it is
the law, and must be obeyed until repealed."
The discrimination in our inheritance law seems no longer justi-,
fiable on any rational basis. The legislation which discriminates
against illegitimacy has not had the desired effect of reducing
illegitimates, and it is probable that illicit sexual conduct would
be more effectually discouraged if the risk of incurring a serious
obligation were substantially increased, that is, if the resulting
child was given substantially the rights of a legitimate child.
By discriminating against the illegitimate child we are allowing
the guilty parties to avoid the consequences of their conduct and
are depriving the illegitimate child, not a party to the conduct,
of valuable rights. In addition, a denial of the same rights of
inheritance and support as are available to the legitimate child
correspondingly increases the state's burden in supporting these
illegitimate children. It may be argued that allowing illegitimate
children to share equally with legitimate children in the assets
of their parents other than money may destroy family unity
and harmony; however, such a result could be easily avoided
by giving the illegitimates their shares in value only, or allow-
ing the legitimate children the option of purchasing the un-
divided interests of the illegitimates in the inherited assets.
Whenever the illegitimate child is able to prove his mater-
nity he should be entitled to inherit from his mother, at least
in value, to the same extent as the legitimate child.8 5 Since,
however, there is a great danger of fraudulent and ill-founded
84. 6 La. Ann. 156, 158 (1851).
85. Traditionally, acknowledgment was the only certain means of estab-
lishing one's fliation and, therefore, mere proof of maternal and paternal
descent was prohibited. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 340 (1804). This was due to
the inability to prove conclusively one's maternal or paternal descent through
then existing methods. In view of modern methods, such as blood tests,
it is possible to positively prove one's flliation. These changed conditions
justify an abandonment of requiring acknowledgment in order to inherit
and to substitute proof of maternity or paternity as the criteria for inheri-
tance rights.
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claims to the succession of the father, it is submitted that the
illegitimate child must be formally acknowledged by the father
before being allowed to share equally with the legitimate chil-
dren in the father's succession. This requirement of acknowl-
edgment by the father would seem to be especially desirable
in view of the fact that after the father's death there is often
no one who could effectively contest the claims of children who
were not his. Although such an acknowledgment should be
a ,prerequisite to inheritance from the father, it should not,
however, be conclusive. Thus, having established his maternity
or having been formally acknowledged by his father, the illegit-
imate child should be allowed his share in value in the suc-
cession of his parents to the same extent as legitimate children.
Conclusion
Although complete abolition of the distinction between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate child is not envisioned,
a reform of the laws discriminating against the illegitimate
without any legal justification seems desirable. An illegitimate
child is likely to be born under conditions less favorable than
the lawful child and thus handicapped at the initial and most
critical stage of its existence. Denial of rights to money and
other property serves only to increase the burden of the state.
Since the state owes a duty to every child, its obligation to the
child is increased in proportion to the degree that its natural
rights have been neglected.
Proof of informal acknowledgment and in certain instances
of maternity or paternity should be sufficient to secure for
the illegitimate child all property rights to which the legitimate
child is entitled except to the succession of his father. To prove
his filiation the illegitimate child should be allowed to use any
available evidence.8 6 Any competent person should be permitted
ried mothers, hospitals, maternity homes, social agencies, and
to bring a suit establishing the paternity or maternity of the
child, as the parties now entitled to bring the suit are often
ignorant of their rights. Through such a plan physicians, unmar-
86. Presently a child may prove his paternity only by showing an
admission of paternity by the father or that the mother lived in concubinage
with the father at the time of the child's birth. LA. CML CODE art. 209 (1870).
To prove maternity a child must establish that the alleged mother is not
married and that he is identically the same person as the mother brought
forth. Id. art. 212. In proving maternity the child is not limited to admis-
sions of maternity made by the mother, but may prove his maternal descent
by any legal evidence. Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La. Ann. 805 (1849).
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reputable citizens having knowledge of the facts would be
required to report all cases coming within the law.87
The position of the illegitimate child in our legal system
must be reexamined with a view toward improving his plight.
The view that the interest of the child is the paramount interest
to which all other considerations should yield must be encour-
aged. It is not only equitable but socially sound. The view that
in the interest of the institution of marriage the fruit of illicit
relations should be deprived of substantial rights is intrinsically
abhorrent. But it is clear that intense prejudices prevail upon
the subject and that the practical difficulties exist in indisputably
establishing paternity in many cases. Whether resting upon
fancied or real grounds, the opposition to a sweeping legislative
reform is for the present apparently insurmountable. It will
take time to win over the public opinion which dictates practical
reform. If immediate results are contemplated, the goal set must
not be unduly high.
William N. Faller
87. While this is a radical departure from LA. CV CODs arts. 208-12 (1870),
which authorize only the child to bring an action for paternity or maternity,
it would provide a system whereby every child would have a greater chance
of establishing his paternity or maternity. For an expanded discussion
of how such a system would operate, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PuB. No. 77,
STANDARDS OF LEGAL PROTECTION FoR CHLDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK (1921).
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